Causal knowledge in evidence-based medicine. In reply to Kerry et al.'s causation and evidence-based practice: an ontological review.
In Causation and evidence-based practice: an ontological review, Kerry et al. argue that evidence-based practice (EBP) should revise its understanding of causation, and take on board a dispositionalist ontology. We point out that the challenges from complexity discussed by Kerry et al., are not properly addressed by their proposed ontology. Rather, the difference making views of causation Kerry et al. criticize, spell out the relevant aspects of causation, and have a range of advantages compared to dispositionalist accounts. We explore some of these here, with a special focus on the role of causal assumptions in inferences from scientific evidence to clinical decisions. A philosophical account should help us explicate the assumptions that go into causal inference in EBM. In doing so, it enables an understanding of the various ways in which these assumptions might fail, and of how they can be justified.